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This article reviews three experiments on event-related potentials (ERPs) testing
the hypothesis that primary visual consciousness (stimulus self-report) is related to
enhanced cortical neural synchronization as a function of stimulus features. ERP peak
latency and sources were compared between “seen” trials and “not seen” trials,
respectively related and unrelated to the primary visual consciousness. Three salient
features of visual stimuli were considered (visuospatial, emotional face expression, and
written words). Results showed the typical visual ERP components in both “seen”
and “not seen” trials. There was no statistical difference in the ERP peak latencies
between the “seen” and “not seen” trials, suggesting a similar timing of the cortical
neural synchronization regardless the primary visual consciousness. In contrast, ERP
sources showed differences between “seen” and “not seen” trials. For the visuospatial
stimuli, the primary consciousness was related to higher activity in dorsal occipital and
parietal sources at about 400 ms post-stimulus. For the emotional face expressions,
there was greater activity in parietal and frontal sources at about 180 ms post-stimulus.
For the written letters, there was higher activity in occipital, parietal and temporal sources
at about 230 ms post-stimulus. These results hint that primary visual consciousness is
associated with an enhanced cortical neural synchronization having entirely different
spatiotemporal characteristics as a function of the features of the visual stimuli and
possibly, the relative qualia (i.e., visuospatial, face expression, and words). In this
framework, the dorsal visual stream may be synchronized in association with the
primary consciousness of visuospatial and emotional face contents. Analogously, both
dorsal and ventral visual streams may be synchronized in association with the primary
consciousness of linguistic contents. In this line of reasoning, the ensemble of the
cortical neural networks underpinning the single visual features would constitute a sort
of multi-dimensional palette of colors, shapes, regions of the visual field, movements,
emotional face expressions, and words. The synchronization of one or more of these
cortical neural networks, each with its peculiar timing, would produce the primary
consciousness of one or more of the visual features of the scene.
Keywords: primary visual consciousness, qualia, high-resolution electroencephalography (EEG), event-related
potentials (ERPs), cortical neural synchronization, dorsal visual stream, ventral visual stream
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PRIMARY VISUAL CONSCIOUSNESS:
WHERE IN THE BRAIN?
Edelman (2003) coined the term primary consciousness referring
to the ability of humans and other animals to integrate, time-by-
time, perceptual and motor events together with the semantic
memory for understanding the main features of the actual
scene. This term is useful to distinguish perceptual awareness
from higher-order consciousness, the latter being the ability
to integrate the current scene with own personal history, own
beliefs, etc.
Primary consciousness regards all common sensory channels
such as vision, hearing, somatotopy, olfaction, taste, and
equilibrium. However, the primary consciousness for the visual
stimuli (objects, faces, locations, etc.) has been particularly
attractive for cognitive neuroscientists, maybe because the
general anatomical and functional properties of the visual system
are quite known (Tononi and Koch, 2008), as a useful starting
point for the challenge. Furthermore, the visual system is one
of the most important perceptual channels for exploring the
environment in humans. Overall, ‘‘primary visual consciousness’’
can be defined as a process underlying an immediate self-
report about the core features of an adequate visual stimulation.
According to Pinker (1997), that self-report implies subjective
phenomenal experience and the ability to describe it.
What are the neural correlates of the primary visual
consciousness? The main issue is ‘‘where’’ there are neurons
in the brain whose activity is related to primary visual
consciousness. Crick and Koch (2003) defined neural correlates
of the primary visual consciousness as ‘‘the minimal set of
neuronal events that give rise to a specific aspect of a conscious
percept’’. In their view, the primary visual consciousness
depends on several coalitions or nodes of neurons that rest
on the properties of highly elaborate neural networks. The
smallest nodes in these neural networks might be cortical
microcolumns (orminicolumn) andmacrocolumns (or columns,
hypercolumns, modules) in the visual cerebral cortex. More
specifically, the cortical microcolumns are formed by a group
of 50–100 neurons having nearly identical receptive fields and
encoding very similar features of the stimulus (Buxhoeveden
and Casanova, 2002). About 50–100 cortical microcolumns form
a macrocolumn in the cerebral cortex (Horton and Adams,
2005). Interestingly, the neurons of a macrocolumn have nearly
identical receptive fields and can be penetrated orderly by
a microelectrode inserted orthogonally to the surface of the
cerebral cortex. These neurons encode a full set of features of
the stimulus possibly associated with the mental representation
of the stimulus characteristics (‘‘qualia’’) during primary visual
consciousness. Keeping in mind the above considerations and
data, it can be speculated that primary visual consciousness
would emerge with the contribution of brain neural correlates
at the mesoscale spatial level, corresponding to local neural
populations in the cortical macrocolumns and microcolumns
(Crick and Koch, 2003).
Apart from the mesoscale level, several neuroscientists
have proposed theories on the neural correlates of primary
visual consciousness implying the contribution of cerebral
neural correlates at macroscale spatial level, corresponding to
gross neural pathways in the brain. The so-called ‘‘globalists’’
posited that primary visual consciousness emerges from
the inter-related activation of vast areas of the brain. In
contrast, the so-called ‘‘localizationists’’ proposed that
visual consciousness does emerge from specific and relative
small brain circuits (see Kouider, 2009). Examples of the
globalist theories are the Dynamic Core theory by Edelman
and Tononi (2000) and the Global Neuronal Workspace
theory by Dehaene and Naccache (2001) and Dehaene
et al. (2003). These theories propose that primary visual
consciousness is the byproduct of a global, widespread
neural activity in thalamocortical circuits in the brain. This
widespread brain neural activity would explain the internal
feeling of ‘‘unicity’’ and ‘‘globality’’ of the experience of
primary visual consciousness. On the other hand, examples
of the localizationist theories are those by Zeki and Bartels
(1999), Milner and Goodale (2006), and Lamme (2010).
Zeki and Bartels (1999) and Zeki (2003) proposed the
Microconsciousnesses theory, positing that the conscious
perceptual representation of visual objects is formed by many
visual ‘‘microconsciousnesses’’ emerging from the activity
distributed in space and time into several specialized visual
areas. In the same vein, Milner and Goodale (2006) presented
the Duplex Vision theory, positing that the conscious perceptual
representation of visual objects emerges from the activity of
the ventral visual pathway in the cerebral cortex while the
consciousness of the visuospatial object features is subserved
by the cortical dorsal visual pathway. As a development of
this localizationist view, Lamme (2010) published the Local
Recurrence Theory, positing that primary visual consciousness
emerges from the local recurrent exchange of signals between
higher- and lower-level visual areas in the cortical ventral
stream.
The distributed brain neural populations involved in the
primary visual consciousness raise the issue of ‘‘how’’ the
activities of these areas are bound and coordinated with each
other, namely the so-called binding problem.
THE BINDING PROBLEM OF THE
PRIMARY VISUAL CONSCIOUSNESS
It can be speculated that the solutions of the binding problem
for the primary visual consciousness have to occur not only
at the level of cortical macrocolumns and microcolumns
(mesoscale), but also at the levels of synapsis (microscale)
and gross cerebral circuits (macroscale). The binding of the
neurons at different spatial scales might be facilitated or
disrupted by neural signals (i.e., action potentials and release of
neurotransmitters) synchronizing in time the activity of these
neurons (i.e., action potentials and post-synaptic potentials)
in cycles of excitation and inhibition. These cycles denote
the emerging feature of the brain, namely its oscillatory
nature.
An example of the neurophysiological oscillatory mechanism
operating at different spatial scales (i.e., synapsis, neural
populations, and brain regions) is the generation of the gamma
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rhythm in the visual cortex during feature analysis of visual
stimuli. This gamma rhythm is characterized by oscillations in
the cortical local field potentials at about 40 Hz, with alternating
positive and negative voltage peaks (macroscale). According to
Engel et al. (1999) and Engel and Singer (2001), these positive
and negative voltage peaks reflect the temporal synchronization
of action and post-synaptic potentials at about 40 Hz in cortical
and thalamocortical neurons located in lateral geniculate nucleus
(LGN), namely the relay-mode neurons whose receptive fields
are nearly overlapping and simultaneously stimulated by an
adequate visual stimulus feature (mesoscale). The synchronous
generation of action and post-synaptic potentials at about
40 Hz in those neurons does establish a neural network
(neural coalition) and is thought to be related to primary
visual consciousness of that stimulus feature (see for example
binocular rivalry process; Engel et al., 1999; Engel and Singer,
2001).
Another example of the neurophysiological oscillatory
mechanism operating at different spatial scales is the generation
of the classical alpha rhythm recorded in visual cortex
during quiet wakefulness (macroscale). This alpha rhythm
is characterized by large oscillations at about 10 Hz, with
alternating positive and negative voltage peaks. According to
Hughes et al. (2004, 2008, 2011) and Lörincz et al. (2008,
2009), these voltage peaks are generated by cortical pyramidal
neurons due to synchronizing signals released by 70% of the
relay-mode neurons firing in the tonic mode (mesoscale). These
thalamocortical neurons are inhibited by GABAergic LGN inter-
neurons (mesoscale). In their turn, the GABAergic inter-neurons
are excited by 30% of thalamocortical LGN neurons, namely the
high threshold neurons firing in the bursting mode (mesoscale).
The population of the high threshold thalamocortical LGN
neurons shows a collective oscillating behavior, due to a fast
propagation of action potentials by electric synapses served
by gap junction proteins (microscale). Those high threshold
thalamocortical LGN neurons would be excited by glutamatergic
and cholinergic neurotransmitters released by cortical and sub-
cortical neurons (Hughes et al., 2008; Lörincz et al., 2008). It can
be speculated that this neurophysiological oscillatory mechanism
regulates arousal and selective attention processes in the visual
cortex, and may play some role in primary visual consciousness
(Babiloni et al., 2014).
An interesting feature of the neurophysiological oscillatory
mechanisms is that more than one rhythm may co-occur
in the same neural population. An enlightening example is
the coding of spatiotemporal trajectories during exploratory
movements in rodent hippocampus (Zheng et al., 2016).
In rats, hippocampal place neurons (mesoscale) emitted
action potentials co-occurring at theta (4–8 Hz) and low-
frequency gamma (around 40 Hz) rhythms to retrieve neural
representations of sequences of locations to reach sometime
after. Differently, they emitted action potentials co-occurring
at theta and high-frequency gamma (around 80 Hz) rhythms
immediately before the actual trajectory to execute in that
place. It was proposed that theta/gamma oscillations sub-
serve the encoding of multiple items of information in
a serial order not only in the hippocampus for spatial
contents but also in other cerebral regions engaged in sensory
integration and working memory (Lisman, 2005; Babiloni
et al., 2009a). In that theoretical framework, theta rhythm
might provide an absolute phase reference to preserving the
encoding order while some gamma cycles into a theta cycle
would encode the single items to be memorized (Lisman,
2005).
Keeping in mind the above data and considerations, a
reasonable theory is that multiple neurophysiological oscillatory
mechanisms synchronize brain neurons at different spatial
scales to regulate brain arousal, activate a selective enhancement
of the stimulus feature extraction, and produce the mental
experience called primary visual consciousness. However, the
methodological approaches by the reported findings have
some limitations in the spatial and temporal resolution of
the neural correlates of the primary visual consciousness in
humans. Concerning the spatial resolution, limited regions
of the brain were explored simultaneously in the mentioned
animal studies (i.e., LGN, hippocampus, entorhinal cortex,
visual cortex), so the neurophysiological binding of remote
and distributed brain networks could not be investigated.
Furthermore, just one cycle of the theta and alpha rhythms
takes about 200 and 100 ms, respectively. Therefore, it was
not possible to study the temporal evolution of the cortical
neural synchronization millisecond-by-millisecond in relation
to the mental experience of primary visual consciousness.
To fill this gap, high-resolution electroencephalography
(EEG) enables the study of cortical neural synchronization
related to primary visual consciousness with those ideal
characteristics.
HIGH-RESOLUTION
ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY (EEG)
Recording of EEG activity from scalp electrodes is typically
used to unveil temporal and spatial information about cortical
neural synchronization and de-synchronization mechanisms
underlying quite wakefulness or the processing of sensory,
cognitive, and motor events (Nuwer, 1988; Steriade, 2006).
During and immediately after these events, changes in the
spontaneous EEG activity can be observed. Averaging the EEG
activity accompanying the single events repeated tens and tens of
time produces a typical sequence of positive and negative voltage
peaks, the so-called event-related potentials (ERPs; Luck, 2005;
Murray et al., 2008).
Spontaneous EEG rhythms may reflect synaptic neural
currents associated with excitatory and inhibitory post-synaptic
potentials in large populations of cortical pyramidal neurons
whose summation produces the local field potentials recordable
by intra-cortical electrodes (Nunez, 2000; Michel et al., 2004;
Rossini et al., 2007; Babiloni et al., 2009a). These EEG rhythms
mainly result from the spatial and temporal summation of
extracellular local field potentials generated in superficial cortical
layers. In the superficial cortical layers, synaptic neural currents
would reflect the synaptic activity of pyramidal neurons located
in the cortical gyri, whose dendrites are oriented radially to the
scalp surface (Nunez and Srinivasan, 2006). Whereas, synaptic
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neural currents of the pyramidal neurons located in the cortical
sulci would propagate tangentially to the scalp surface, providing
a minor contribution to the generation of on-going scalp EEG
rhythms (Nunez, 2000). Spontaneous EEG activity is usually
recorded to assess states of vigilance or consciousness like sleep
and resting state wakefulness at eyes closed or open. The analysis
of spontaneous EEG rhythms can reveal resting state oscillatory
activity, epileptic seizures or sleep spindles. Such analysis is
performed in the frequency domain, and typically implies the
computation of EEG power density at the electrode and/or the
quantification of the functional connectivity of EEG rhythms
recorded from different electrodes.
The ERPsmay reflect coordinated neural network activity and
can be considered as a series of transient post-synaptic responses
of main pyramidal neurons triggered by a specific stimulus
(Pfurtscheller and Lopes da Silva, 1999). The physiological
basis of cortical ERPs arises from synchronous interactions
among large numbers of participating neurons, including
local interactions involving excitatory pyramidal neurons and
inhibitory interneurons, as well as long-range interactions
mediated by axonal pathways in the white matter (Lopes da
Silva, 1991; Bressler, 2002). Measurement of ERPs requires
averaging of many EEG epochs that are phase- and time-locked
to sensory, cognitive or motor ‘‘events,’’ in order to remove
nonphase-locked EEG rhythms from ERPs. Event-related
cortical activity can be quantified by measuring latencies
and amplitudes of distinct ERP components in the time
domain.
On the other hand, the spatial resolution of EEG techniques
depends on the amount of EEG channels, and also on
mathematical procedures to model cortical sources of EEG
activity and to take into account the properties of the head as
a volume conductor (Nunez, 2000). High-density EEG using
between 48 and 256 electrodes, along with proper mathematical
procedures, can achieve a spatial resolution in the order of
few centimeters. Regularized linear procedures are typically
used for solving the inverse problem, which provides an
approximation of current density at the cortical source models
on the basis of the head volume conductor properties and of the
voltages/current density at the scalp locations (Pascual-Marqui
and Michel, 1994; Grech et al., 2008; Rossetti and Kaplan, 2010).
Cortical sources of the resting state EEG rhythms or ERPs can
be reliably estimated by low-resolution brain electromagnetic
tomography analysis (LORETA1; Pascual-Marqui and Michel,
1994; Pascual-Marqui et al., 1999, 2002). LORETA is a functional
imaging technique estimating smoothed linear inverse solutions
accounting for distributed EEG sources within Talairach space
(Pascual-Marqui et al., 2002). This software computes 3-D
linear solution for the EEG inverse problem within a three-
shell spherical head model including the scalp, skull, and
brain compartments. The brain compartments are restricted
to the cortical gray matter/parahippocampal regions and are
co-registered to the Talairach probability brain atlas. This
compartment includes 2394 voxels (7 mm resolution), each voxel
containing an equivalent current dipole. A better solution for
1http://www.uzh.ch/keyinst/loreta.htm
source localization can be achieved by eLORETA and sLORETA
than original LORETA (Pascual-Marqui et al., 2002; Pascual-
Marqui, 2007). eLORETA uses a realistic head model (Fuchs
et al., 2002) using the MNI152 template (Mazziotta et al., 2001),
with a three-dimensional solution space restricted to cortical gray
matter and electrode coordinates provided by Jurcak et al. (2007).
The intracerebral volume is partitioned in 6239 voxels with 5
mm spatial resolution. Thus, eLORETA images obtained from
EEG data represent the electrical activity at each voxel in the
neuroanatomic Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space as
the exact magnitude of the estimate current density. Anatomical
labels as Brodmann areas are also reported usingMNI space, with
adaptation to Talairach space (Brett et al., 2002).
A SCIENTIFIC PROGRAM TO
INVESTIGATE ERP CORTICAL SOURCES
DURING PRIMARY VISUAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN HUMANS
In the past years, we have developed a scientific program
using high-resolution EEG to investigate ERP cortical sources
related to primary visual consciousness in healthy adults.
The main hypothesis was that ERP source activity would
reflect the fine (milliseconds) time evolution in the cortical
neural synchronization related to primary visual consciousness.
Furthermore, it was expected that the ERP source activity would
unveil the role of this synchronization in different brain regions
as a function of the diverse ‘‘qualia’’ characterizing the conscious
experience (Babiloni et al., 2014).
In the scientific program, the same basic stimulus paradigm
was used to investigate the primary visual consciousness for
three basic visual features such as visuospatial, face emotions,
and written words. The stimulus paradigm was based on
the following sequence of visual stimuli: (i) the background
masking stimulus (forward masking hiding the cue); (ii) the
cue stimulus (the stimulus to self-report at the end of the
trial); (iii) the background masking stimulus (backward masking
hiding the cue); and (iv) the target stimulus (the ‘‘go’’ stimulus
eliciting a hand motor response, namely pressing a mouse
button).
In all the quoted experiments, the duration of the cue stimuli
was determined subject-by-subject with a preliminary short
behavioral test lasting few minutes (no EEG recording). In that
test, the subject received the cue stimuli with different duration
on a computer monitor and had to provide a hand response
on a computer button. The subjects used the hand response to
communicating if the cue stimulus had been seen. The sequence
of the cue stimuli was planned to mix the cue stimuli with
different duration in a pseudorandom order. This procedure
avoided learning effects during the session.
A dedicated software computed the percentages of ‘‘seen’’
cue stimuli for every stimulus durations. Based on these data,
the experimenters selected the cue stimulus duration nearest
to 50% of ‘‘seen’’ cases in that particular subject (threshold
time). On the other hand, the ‘‘optimal’’ duration of the cue
stimulus was always kept fixed on a given subject during the
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second part of the experiment, namely the phase of the EEG
recording.
Threshold time of the cue stimuli was slightly different in
our three experiments. Specifically, the mean (standard error
mean, SE) threshold time of the cue stimuli was 101 ms (8.8)
in the ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment, 64.6 ms (9.1) in the ‘‘face
expression’’ experiment, and 37.2 ms (2.7) in the ‘‘written words’’
experiment. In the ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment, we performed a
control analysis showing that the percentage of ‘‘seen’’ trials did
not change during three different periods of the EEG experiment
(initial, intermediate, and final). This control finding suggested
that in the present experimental conditions, learning and fatigue
processes may not play a major role in the ability of the brain
to produce primary consciousness in about 50% of the (cue)
visual stimuli. This finding validated the choice of the ‘‘optimal’’
stimulus duration in the preliminary phase, before the phase of
EEG recordings.
In the ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment, the cue stimulus feature
of interest was the localization of a circle at the right or left
side of a computer screen. The ‘‘go’’ stimulus (a circle at left
or right side of the computer) elicited the click on the right
or left mouse button. In the ‘‘face expression’’ experiment, the
cue stimulus feature of interest was the expression of the mouth
in an emoticon (happy, sad or neutral). The ‘‘go’’ stimulus (an
emoticon with the mouth conveying happy or sad expression)
elicited the click on the right or left mouse button as a function
of the emotional expression represented in the emoticon. In the
‘‘written word’’ experiment, the cue stimulus feature of interest
was one of four words. The ‘‘go’’ stimulus (the same words)
elicited the click on the right or left mouse button as a function
of the semantic meaning of the words (i.e., living being vs. not
living being). Immediately after the hand motor response, the
subjects had to say ‘‘seen’’ if they had detected the cue stimulus
(‘‘seen’’ trial) or ‘‘not seen’’ if they had missed it (‘‘not seen’’
trial’’).
In all our experiments on primary consciousness, the
instructions for subjects emphasized to balance accuracy and
speed in the hand motor response immediately after the ‘‘go’’
stimuli. Of note, the subjects communicated ‘‘seen’’ or ‘‘not seen’’
for the cue stimulus verbally only after their hand response to
the ‘‘go’’ (target) stimulus. Therefore, they had some seconds
to prepare the verbal response ‘‘seen’’ or ‘‘not seen’’ in the
period from the appearance of the cue stimulus to the hand
motor performance following the ‘‘go’’ stimulus. This design
minimized the effects of uncertainty, confusion, and impulse
responses in the communication of the verbal response ‘‘seen’’
or ‘‘not seen’’. Of note, alternative procedures can be better
when the degree of awareness is of interest for the working
hypothesis. In this case, it is recommended the use of a
fine-grained scale to recollect the subject’s impression about
the visual stimulus. For example, a reference experiment on
primary visual consciousness used a 4-point subjective scale
(Perceptual Awareness Scale, PAS) including the following levels:
‘‘no experience of the stimulus’’, ‘‘brief glimpse of the stimulus
but could not recognize what it was’’, ‘‘almost clear impression
of the stimulus’’, and ‘‘clear impression of the stimulus’’ (Melloni
et al., 2011).
The basic concept of the paradigm in the above three
experiments is that a statistical difference in the ERP source
activity between ‘‘seen trials’’ and ‘‘not seen trials’’ would confirm
the hypothesis that primary visual consciousness is strictly
associated with an enhanced cortical neural synchronization. In
the case of a difference in the ERP peak latency, such difference
would unveil a specific timing of the neural correlates of the
primary visual consciousness. In the case of a difference in the
ERP source topography, such difference would unveil the cortical
regions associated with primary visual consciousness of the given
stimulus feature.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic sequence of the cue, mask, and
go stimuli in the above three experiments. The main results
of those experiments are shortly reported and discussed in the
following sections. More details can be found in the original
articles (Babiloni et al., 2006, 2010, under major revision in
2016).
THE EXPERIMENT ON THE ERPs
ACCOMPANYING THE PRIMARY
CONSCIOUSNESS OF VISUOSPATIAL
STIMULI
Figure 2 illustrates the main results of our ‘‘visuospatial’’
experiment on the ERPs accompanying primary visual
consciousness. As mentioned above, the cue stimulus feature of
interest was the localization of a circle at the right or left side of a
computer screen. The post-stimulus ERP waveforms showed the
highest amplitude at the parieto-occipital midline. In Figure 2,
the ERP waveforms refer to the POz electrode (10–20 system)
and unveil the standard sequence of positive (P) and negative
(N) voltage peaks typically following simple visual stimuli.
Specifically, three main ERP components were found, namely
the N1, P2, and P3. The peaks of these components were well
visible in the ERPs formed averaging separately the three classes
of trials occurring in the experiment, namely the ‘‘seen’’, the
‘‘not seen’’, and the ‘‘baseline’’ trials. The ‘‘baseline’’ trials had a
control purpose. In these trials, after the background masking
stimulus, a black screen instead of a circle was presented. The
‘‘baseline’’ trials allowed controlling the reliability of the subjects’
self-report (i.e., the percentage of the self-report ‘‘not seen’’
in the ‘‘baseline’’ trials) and the ERPs (i.e., similar ERPs were
expected in the ‘‘not seen’’ and in the ‘‘baseline’’ trials). Indeed,
the control results confirmed the good reliability of the subjects’
self-reports and the ERPs in the present experimental conditions.
The presence of ERPs in the ‘‘baseline’’ trials should not be a
surprise, since these ERPs were indeed evoked by the change in
the visual scene from the background masking stimulus to the
black screen.
An interesting result of the ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment was the
lack of statistical difference (p > 0.05) in the latency of the N1,
P2, and P3 peaks when the ERPs accompanying the ‘‘seen’’ trials
were compared with those accompanying the ‘‘not seen’’ trials.
This result points to the same timing and stages of cortical neural
synchronization in the ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials, regardless the
primary visual consciousness. However, the neural correlates of
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of visual stimulus events during the paradigm used in three studies on primary visual consciousness whose results are
reviewed in the present article (Babiloni et al., 2006, 2010, under major revision in 2016). In those studies, the sequences of visual stimuli are represented in
the left (“visuospatial” experiment), middle (“face expression” experiment), and right (“written words” experiment) parts of figure. In the vertical axis of the diagrams,
the sequence of the visual stimuli is illustrated. In the three studies, the same basic stimulus paradigm was used. The stimulus paradigm was based on the following
sequence of visual stimuli: the cue (the stimulus to self-report at the end of the trial), the mask (hiding the cue), and the target (the “go” stimulus eliciting a hand motor
response, namely pressing a mouse button). Importantly, the duration of the cue stimulus was defined individual-by-individual with a preliminary short experiment.
The duration of the cue stimulus had to induce a primary visual consciousness (i.e., self-report) of the stimulus feature of interest in about 50% of cases. In the
“visuospatial” experiment, the cue stimulus feature of interest was the localization of a circle at the right or left side of a computer screen. The “go” stimulus (a circle
at left or right side of the computer) elicited the click on the right or left mouse button. In the “face expression” experiment, the cue stimulus feature of interest was
the expression of the mouth in an emoticon. The “go” stimulus (a mouth conveying happy or sad face expression) elicited the click on the right or left mouse button.
In the “written words” experiment, the cue stimulus feature of interest was one of some words. The “go” stimulus (the same words) elicited the click on the right or
left mouse button as a function of the semantic meaning of the words (i.e., living being vs. not living being). Immediately after the hand motor response, the subjects
had to say “seen” if they had detected the cue stimulus (“seen trial”) or “not seen” if they had missed it (“not seen trial”).
the primary visual consciousness were not useless. The reaction
time of the ‘‘go stimuli’’ was faster in the ‘‘seen’’ than the ‘‘not
seen’’ trials as whether the primary consciousness is associated
with an enhanced information processing of visuospatial stimuli.
Noteworthy, this difference was not due to the lack of any
beneficial effect of the cue stimuli in the ‘‘not seen’’ trials. Indeed,
the cue stimuli speeded the reaction time of the ‘‘go stimuli’’
even in the ‘‘not seen’’ trials, pointing to an ability of the brain
to extract and use spatial information from the cue stimuli not
only in association with primary consciousness but also outside
of it.
When did the cortical neural synchronization show some
difference in relation to the primary consciousness of visuospatial
stimuli? In the ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment, the parietal P3
component peaking about at 400 ms post-stimulus was
higher in amplitude in the ‘‘seen’’ than the ‘‘not seen’’ trials
(p < 0.05). This result suggests that human brain does
process simple visuospatial stimuli with enhanced cortical neural
synchronization around 400ms post-stimulus in association with
the primary consciousness. Interestingly, this result cannot be
explained by the physical features of the cue stimuli, as the ‘‘seen’’
and ‘‘not seen’’ trials were physically identical (i.e., duration,
color, shape, size, brightness, contrast, etc.). Furthermore, there
was no effect of the motor response, as the cue stimulus required
no immediate behavioral response. Indeed, the subjects had to
produce a simple motor response after the ‘‘go’’ stimulus in both
‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials.
Where did the cortical neural synchronization show
some differences in relation to the primary consciousness
of visuospatial stimuli? The source analysis (LORETA) of
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FIGURE 2 | Core results of the experimental paradigm used in the
study of Babiloni et al. (2006). Top: waveforms of the grand averaged
(N = 12) event-related potentials (ERPs) are shown at POz electrode for the
three classes of events of this experiment on visuospatial primary visuospatial
consciousness, namely “baseline” (cue stimulus not presented after the
central fixation stimulus as a control condition), “not seen” (cue stimulus not
detected), and “seen” (cue stimulus detected) trials. Bottom: the grand
averaged low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (LORETA)
solutions modeling the distributed source activity for P3 component of the
ERPs are shown. These solutions were based on the electroencephalographic
(EEG) voltages recorded from all 128 recording electrodes at the P3 peak
latency. They concerned the three classes of the mentioned events separately.
For more details, see the main text and the original article (Babiloni et al.,
2006).
the parietal P3 component pointed to higher current density
in extrastriate occipital and posterior parietal areas in the
‘‘seen’’ than the ‘‘not seen’’ trials (p < 0.05, Figure 2). This
result suggests that human brain processes simple visuospatial
stimuli with an enhanced cortical neural synchronization in
extrastriate occipital and posterior parietal areas around 400 ms
post-stimulus in association with the primary consciousness.
Keeping in mind the above findings, the ‘‘visuospatial’’
experiment disclosed a quite similar temporal evolution of the
cortical neural synchronization in the occipital and parietal
cortical ‘‘dorsal’’ stream for the processing of visuospatial stimuli
with and without primary consciousness. However, the primary
consciousness of those stimuli was associated with an enhanced
neural synchronization in that cortical pathway around 400 ms
post-stimulus. Furthermore, the behavioral performance was
better in the trials associated with the primary consciousness
when compared to those in which the cue stimuli were not
perceived consciously.
The results of our ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment extended
previous evidence on ERPs and primary visuospatial
consciousness. The extension concerned the estimation
of ERP cortical sources and the fine control of the motor
aspects of the task (Babiloni et al., 2006). The findings of this
experiment specified the topography in parietal and occipital
cortex of the effects of primary visuospatial consciousness
without motor confounds (Babiloni et al., 2006). Other studies
documented differences between ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials
in ERPs distributed over widespread posterior scalp regions at
200–400 ms after the presentation of different types of stimuli
(visuospatial, letters, gabor patchs, etc.) with paradigms of
binocular rivalry, attentional blink, visual masking, threshold
detection tasks, etc. (see Railo et al., 2011 for a review). All those
ERP studies showed an increased P3 amplitude in widespread
scalp regions in relation to primary visual consciousness
(Fernandez-Duque et al., 2003; Del Cul et al., 2007; Lamy
et al., 2009; Chica et al., 2010), especially when experimental
demands did not induce a stimulus expectancy (Melloni
et al., 2011). In this context, the topographical specificity of
our findings was confirmed by magnetoencephalographic
(MEG) evidence (Liu et al., 2012). That MEG study reported
cortical source activity in bilateral occipital-temporal (but
not parietal) regions at about 200–350 ms post-stimulus in
association with primary visual consciousness of non-spatial
stimuli (Liu et al., 2012). The findings of our ‘‘visuospatial’’
experiment corroborated the involvement of parietal and
occipital cortex in the primary visuospatial consciousness
(Babiloni et al., 2006), thus complementing the previous view
on the functional role of parietal cortical areas in visuo-spatial
attention and consciousness (Driver et al., 2001; Chica et al.,
2010).
It should be remarked that in our ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment,
primary consciousness concerned the appearance or not
(subjective awareness) of the visual stimulus with no requirement
to specify its characterizing features for control purposes. This
methodology reduced anxiety and uncertainty in the response
but did not permit a strict direct control of its validity. However,
an indirect control was provided by converging evidence. There
was a low rate of false positive recognitions (around 3%) and
the beneficial covert cue effects on the mean reaction times
to the ‘‘go’’ stimuli (faster reaction time for the ‘‘go’’ stimuli
appearing from the same side of the ‘‘seen’’ cue stimuli).
Another confirmation of the reliability of the self-report in these
threshold experiments was indirectly given by Lamy et al. (2009).
They reported that a widespread posterior P3 was higher in
amplitude for ‘‘seen’’ stimuli associated with the primary visual
consciousness and correct localization when compared to ‘‘not
seen’’ stimuli. Overall, these findings confirmed the general
reliability of the self-report and the objective measures in our
experiment.
The ERP results of our ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment suggested
that primary visual consciousness of spatial qualia is mainly
related to a late stage of the brain stimulus information
processing, namely at the time of the P3 component
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(i.e., 200–400 ms post-stimulus). This finding is in line with
several ERP studies mentioned above (see Railo et al., 2011
for a review). However, other ERP studies found differences
between ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ visual stimuli in posterior
cortical areas near 100 ms post-stimulus, at around the
peak of P1 component (Pins and Ffytche, 2003; Mathewson
et al., 2009). Furthermore, MEG techniques with a high
spatial resolution reported event-related magnetic fields
accompanying primary visual consciousness in contralateral
temporal cortex at around 120 ms post-stimulus, showing a
dissociation from spatial attention processes (Wyart et al.,
2012). Despite this very interesting previous evidence, more
research is needed to clarify spatial, temporal, frequency,
and phase features of neurophysiological mechanisms and
brain neural circuits underpinning the complex interaction
between consciousness and other factors such as visual stimulus
expectancy and physical visibility, spatial pre-attentive and
attention processes, and paradigm time constraints and
cognitive load (Lavie, 2006; Wyart and Tallon-Baudry,
2008; Melloni et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2012; Wyart et al.,
2012).
In this vein, another ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment of our group
required subjects to provide a hand response when a central
‘‘go’’ (target) appeared (Babiloni et al., 2009b). The subjects
had to press the button located in the side opposite (mental
inversion of the spatial location) to that of a visual cue delivered
at threshold time to produce ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials.
Instructions asked a hand response in one side in any case,
even when the cue was not consciously perceived. Results
showed that ERP sources were higher in activity for the ‘‘seen’’
than ‘‘not seen’’ trials from 100–400 ms post-stimulus. Source
topography of this ERP activity was located not only in occipital
and parietal cortical areas but also in the prefrontal cortex,
particularly in the latency of the P3 component (Babiloni et al.,
2009b). More research is needed to disentangle the early neural
correlates of primary visual consciousness from preconscious
modulation of stimulus features, depending on the probability of
a subsequent self-report (Pins and Ffytche, 2003; Koivisto et al.,
2008).
In addition to the studies on healthy subjects, the results
of our ‘‘visuospatial’’ ERP experiment also complement and
maybe enlighten neurophysiological underpinning of previous
studies on abnormal primary consciousness of visuospatial
stimuli in neurological subjects with visuospatial neglect and
visual extinction, namely deficits in the spatial awareness for
stimuli on the side opposite to a brain lesion (Driver et al.,
1997; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). Visual extinction is often
present in patients with focal parietal lesions, typically in the
right posterior parietal cortex, whereas the primary sensory
pathways are intact. It is characterized by a spared ability to
detect a stimulus presented unilaterally on either hemifield,
but if the stimulation is bilateral, the stimulus presented in
the ipsilateral field is detected while that on the contralateral
field is ‘‘extinguished’’ from consciousness. Both behavioral
and neuroimaging results have found that extinguished visual
stimuli may be processed in patients with extinction. The
reaction times to target stimuli on the ipsilesional visual
hemifield is affected by concurrent undetected stimuli on the
contralesional visual hemifield (Marzi et al., 1996; Vuilleumier
and Rafal, 2000). Moreover, visual extinction is affected by the
semantic relationship between concurrent ipsilesional (‘‘seen’’)
and contralesional (‘‘extinguished’’ or ‘‘not seen’’) stimuli (Baylis
et al., 1993; Mattingley et al., 1997; Vuilleumier and Rafal,
2000).
Further relevant data come from previous functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) showing that the
extinguished stimuli are processed in neurological patients
by the same occipital and parietal areas of the ‘‘dorsal stream’’
exhibiting enhanced P3 source activity in the ‘‘seen’’ trials in our
‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment performed in healthy subjects (Driver,
1996; Driver et al., 1997; Heilman et al., 1997; Robertson et al.,
1997; Driver and Mattingley, 1998). In the bilateral stimulation
trials, those neurological patients consciously perceived only
the stimuli delivered at the right hemifield, but those cortical
areas were activated despite the extinction of left visual stimuli
(Rees et al., 2000; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). In those neurological
patients, the same occipital and parietal areas of the ‘‘dorsal
stream’’ were maximally activated in the ‘‘seen’’ trials, namely
the trials in which they consciously perceived both left and right
visual stimuli (Marzi et al., 2000; Driver et al., 2001; Vuilleumier
et al., 2001).
The results of our ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment also complement
those of previous ERP evidence in neurological patients with
‘‘visual extinction’’ (Marzi et al., 2000; Driver and Vuilleumier,
2001; Vuilleumier et al., 2001). More specifically, Marzi et al.
(2000) showed the presence of ERP components in both ‘‘seen’’
and ‘‘not seen’’ trials during bilateral visual stimulation in
a patient with visual extinction. Nevertheless, occipital and
parietal ERPs of the right (damaged) hemisphere were higher
in amplitude in ‘‘seen’’ than in ‘‘not seen’’ trials in line with
the results of the present ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment in healthy
subjects. Furthermore, Vuilleumier et al. (2001) reported the
presence of occipital early ERP components during bilateral
stimulation only in the ‘‘seen’’ trials in another patient with
‘‘visual extinction’’, whereas the late ERP components including
the posterior P3 were observed in both ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’
trials. Indeed, we observed substantial P3 source activity in both
‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials in the healthy subjects of the present
‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment. A very promising clinical application
of the present methodological approach will be the study of ERP
sources in those neurological patients during ‘‘seen’’ (unilateral,
bilateral) and ‘‘not seen’’ trials.
THE EXPERIMENT ON THE ERPs
ACCOMPANYING THE PRIMARY
CONSCIOUSNESS OF SCHEMATIC FACE
EXPRESSIONS
Figure 3 illustrates the main results of our ‘‘face expression’’
experiment on the ERPs accompanying primary visual
consciousness (Babiloni et al., 2010). As mentioned above,
the cue stimulus feature of interest was the detection of the
mouth of an emoticon, representing schematic emotional
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FIGURE 3 | Core results of the experimental paradigm used in the
study of Babiloni et al. (2010). Top: waveforms of the grand averaged
(N = 15) ERPs are shown at Pz electrode for the sad condition in the “not
seen” and “seen” trials. Bottom: the grand averaged LORETA solutions
modeling the distributed source activity for N170 component of the ERPs are
shown. These solutions were based on the EEG voltages recorded from all
128 recording electrodes at the N170 peak latency. They concerned the “not
seen” and “seen” trials averaged separately. For more details, see the main
text and the original article (Babiloni et al., 2010).
face expressions (i.e., neutral, sad, and happy). The post-
stimulus ERP waveforms showed a highest amplitude at the
parietal midline electrodes. In the Figure 3, the group ERP
waveforms refer to Pz electrode (10–20 system) and unveil
the standard sequence of positive (P) and negative (N) voltage
peaks typically following face stimuli. Specifically, four main
ERP components were found, namely the N100, N170, P200,
and P300. The peaks of these components were well visible
in the ERPs formed averaging separately the two classes of
trials occurring in the experiment (i.e., the ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not
seen’’) for the three emotional conditions (i.e., neutral, sad, and
happy).
Also for the ‘‘face expression’’ experiment, there was a lack
of statistical difference (p > 0.05) in the latency of the N100,
N170, P200, and P300 peaks when the ERPs accompanying
the ‘‘seen’’ trials were compared with those accompanying the
‘‘not seen’’ trials in a given emotional condition. This result
confirmed that of the ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment, and points
to the same timing of cortical neural synchronization in the
‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials, regardless the primary visual
consciousness and the emotions conveyed by the schematic
face expressions. However, the neural correlates of the primary
visual consciousness were not useless. As for the ‘‘visuospatial’’
experiment, the reaction time of the ‘‘go stimuli’’ was faster
in the ‘‘seen’’ than the ‘‘not seen’’ trials, especially when the
target face was ‘‘happy’’, as whether the primary consciousness
was associated with an enhanced information processing of
visuospatial stimuli.
When did the cortical neural synchronization show some
difference in relation to primary consciousness of schematic
emotional face expressions? In the ‘‘face expression’’ experiment,
the parietal N170 component peaked about at 180–200 ms
post-stimulus for all three emotional face expressions (i.e.,
neutral, sad, and happy). Furthermore, this ERP component was
higher in amplitude in the ‘‘seen’’ than the ‘‘not seen’’ trials
(p < 0.05). This result suggests that human brain does process
schematic emotional face expressions with enhanced cortical
neural synchronization around 200 ms post-stimulus, possibly in
association with the primary consciousness. Interestingly, N170
peak latency was earlier than that of the P3 peak in ‘‘visuospatial’’
experiment (e.g., 400 ms post-stimulus). This difference is
suggestive of faster information processing for the primary
consciousness of the schematic emotional face expressions,
maybe for their obvious biological and social salience (Batty and
Taylor, 2003).
Where did the cortical neural synchronization show some
differences in relation to the primary consciousness of schematic
emotional face expressions? As a main finding, the source
analysis (LORETA) of the N170 component pointed to higher
current density in prefrontal, premotor, and posterior parietal
areas in the primary consciousness of the sad face expression
(p < 0.05, Figure 3). This result suggests that human
brain processes schematic emotional face expressions with an
early (i.e., 200 ms post-stimulus) enhanced cortical neural
synchronization in a distributed frontal and parietal network, not
including temporal face processing area.
The results of the ‘‘face expression’’ experiment complement
previous fMRI evidence showing that awareness of emotional
face expressions specifically enhanced activation of bilateral
parietal, temporal, and frontal areas (Vuilleumier et al., 2002).
Furthermore, these results extend previous ERP evidence on
N170 and N250 components associated with face stimuli
(Bentin et al., 2002; Schweinberger and Burton, 2003). In the
previous ERP studies, these early components were modulated
by the primary consciousness of the emotional valence of
both schematic and photographic facial expressions (Sokolov
and Boucsein, 2000; Balconi and Lucchiari, 2005; Krombholz
et al., 2007). Instead, later N400 component was modulated
by the primary consciousness of the emotional valence of
photographic facial stimuli (Halgren and Marinkovic, 1995;
Kiefer and Spitzer, 2000). Keeping in mind the above data,
the ‘‘face expression’’ experiment suggests that the primary
consciousness of schematic face expressions may emerge
from early (i.e., 200 ms post-stimulus) in relation to the
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activation in associative parietal and frontal cortical areas not
specialized for basic face information processing and largely
different from those activated by visuospatial stimuli. Again,
the primary consciousness may be related to an enhanced
cortical neural synchronization generating enhanced ERP source
activity.
As for primary visuospatial consciousness, high-resolution
EEG/MEG recordings from primary visual cortex are needed
for a better understanding of the early stages of the processing
of face stimuli. Sandberg et al. (2013) used MEG recordings
during a binocular rivalry task with competing faces and
gratings. Primary visual consciousness of faces was associated
with enhanced occipital event-related magnetic fields (ERMFs)
peaking at about 180 ms (M170) and 260 ms post-stimulus
(P2 m).
Summing up, our ‘‘face expression’’ experiment showed that
the primary visual consciousness of emoticons was associated
with a negative ERP component named N170. Source analysis
suggested an enhanced cortical neural synchronization in a
distributed frontal and parietal network, not including temporal
face processing cortex (Babiloni et al., 2010). These findings
complement previous evidence showing that passive conscious
perception of uncued visual stimuli was related to the so-called
‘‘visual awareness negativity’’ (VAN) over occipito-temporal
electrodes from 200–400 ms post-stimulus (Koivisto et al.,
2005; Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2008). More research with
different semantic, emotional, and pictorial stimulus features is
required to understand the neurophysiological meaning of the
spatial localization of the effects in the present and mentioned
studies.
THE EXPERIMENT ON THE ERPs
ACCOMPANYING THE PRIMARY
CONSCIOUSNESS OF WRITTEN WORDS
Figure 4 illustrates the main results of our ‘‘written word’’
experiment on the ERPs accompanying primary visual
consciousness (Babiloni et al., under major revision in 2016).
As mentioned above, the cue stimulus feature of interest was
the reading of four common Italian words, two denoting living
beings (‘‘cane’’, ‘‘mulo’’; English: ‘‘dog’’ and ‘‘mule’’) and two
denoting not living beings (‘‘pane’’, ‘‘muro’’; English: ‘‘bread’’
and ‘‘wall’’). The words of living and not living beings differed
only in one single letter. The post-stimulus ERP waveforms
showed the highest amplitude at the parietal and temporal
electrodes. In Figure 4, the ERP waveforms refer to Pz electrode
(10–20 system) and unveil four main components, namely the
P1, ‘‘N1’’, P2 and P3. The peaks of these components were well
visible in the ERPs formed averaging separately the ‘‘seen’’ and
‘‘not seen’’ trials. As for the other two experiments, there was the
lack of statistical difference (p > 0.05) in the latency of the P1,
‘‘N1’’, P2 and P3 peaks when the ERPs accompanying the ‘‘seen’’
trials were compared with those accompanying the ‘‘not seen’’
trials.
This result confirmed those of the ‘‘visuospatial’’ and ‘‘face
expression’’ experiments and points to the same timing of cortical
neural synchronization in the ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials,
FIGURE 4 | Core results of the experimental paradigm used in the
study of Babiloni et al. (under major revision in 2016). Top: waveforms of
the grand averaged (N = 17) ERPs are shown at Pz electrode for the “not
seen” and “seen” trials. Bottom: the grand averaged eLORETA solutions
modeling the distributed source activity for N1 component of the ERPs are
shown. These solutions were based on the EEG voltages recorded from all 56
recording electrodes at the N1 peak latency. They concerned the “not seen”
and “seen” trials averaged separately.
regardless the primary visual consciousness. Again, the reaction
time of the ‘‘go stimuli’’ was faster in the ‘‘seen’’ than the ‘‘not
seen’’ trials, confirming the general concept that the primary
consciousness was associated with an enhanced information
processing of visual stimuli.
When did the cortical neural synchronization show some
difference in relation to the primary consciousness of written
words? In the ‘‘written words’’ experiment, the parietal ‘‘N1’’
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component peaked about at 230 ms post-stimulus. This ERP
component was the one that showed the highest difference
between the ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials (a higher amplitude
in former than the latter, p < 0.05). This result suggests
that human brain does process written words with enhanced
cortical neural synchronization around 230 ms post-stimulus,
possibly in association with the primary consciousness. As for
the N170 of the face expressions (180–200 ms post-stimulus),
the ‘‘N1’’ peak latency was earlier than that of the P3 peak
in ‘‘visuospatial’’ experiment (e.g., 400 ms post-stimulus). This
difference is suggestive of fast information processing for the
primary consciousness of the written words, maybe for their
intense learning along the whole life span (Batty and Taylor,
2003).
Where did the cortical neural synchronization show some
differences in relation to the primary consciousness of written
words? As the main finding, the source analysis of the ‘‘N1’’
component pointed to higher (eLORETA) current density in
left parietal, occipital, and temporal areas in the primary
consciousness of the written words (p < 0.05, Figure 4). This
result suggests that human brain does process written words with
an early (i.e., 230 ms post-stimulus) enhanced cortical neural
synchronization in a left dorsal and ventral streams formed by
occipital, parietal, and temporal areas. Namely, a cortical network
different from those involved in the primary consciousness of
visuospatial and schematic face expressions.
The results of the ‘‘written words’’ experiment extend to
the cortical source space previous evidence showing early ERP
components induced by the visual presentation of words within
an ‘‘attentional blink’’ paradigm (Vogel et al., 1998; Sergent et al.,
2005). In the ‘‘attentional blink’’, two visual stimuli are presented
in quick sequence, with the lack of conscious perception of the
second one due to the residual cortical processing of the first
stimulus. In our experiment, the effect of the primary visual
consciousness was observed on ‘‘N1’’ component peaking at 230
ms post-stimulus. We put between brackets N1 as its latency is
quite late for the typical N1 of visual evoked potentials. Rather, it
shows the features of the so-called ‘‘visual awareness negativity’’
of the ERPs accompanying primary consciousness (see Railo
et al., 2011 for a review).
Previous studies have shown that early visual P1 and N1
components, which were evoked by a probe flash (first stimulus)
concomitant to the presentation of the letter (second stimulus),
were preserved during the period when the stimulus report
was affected by the ‘‘attentional blink’’ (Vogel et al., 1998).
Furthermore, it has been shown that intact early scalp potentials
(P1 and N1) were evoked by ‘‘not seen’’ words (second stimulus),
suggesting that these ERP components were not the primary
correlates of conscious perception in the ‘‘attentional blink’’ of
words (Sergent et al., 2005). In line with the results of our
‘‘written words’’ experiment, a negativity peaking in the scalp
parietal regions at about 270 ms post-stimulus was higher in
amplitude in the ‘‘seen’’ than ‘‘not seen’’ words of the ‘‘attentional
blink’’ paradigm (Sergent et al., 2005).
More recently, Melloni et al. (2011) using a letter recognition
task reported that stimulus expectancy can reduce the latency
of neuronal correlates of primary visual consciousness. Those
authors used a paradigm manipulating the physical level of
stimulus visibility and the stimulus expectancy parametrically.
The ERP difference between ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials were
observed at the latency range of P3 component when there
was a negligible stimulus expectancy (Melloni et al., 2011). In
contrast, the ERP difference between ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials
was observed already at the P2 latency range when stimulus
expectation was high. In that study (Melloni et al., 2011), the P2
amplitude decreased as the awareness of the stimulus increased
(i.e., the amplitude of P2 was higher for the ‘‘not seen’’ trials
than the ‘‘seen’’ trials). This result is apparently at odds with the
literature regarding consciousness and requires future studies to
be elucidated. We can provide just a tentative explanation in the
following. In general, P2 component reflects the comparison of
sensory inputs and stored memory (Luck and Hillyard, 1994).
Therefore, it can be speculated that the high amplitude of P2
for the ‘‘not seen’’ trials (Melloni et al., 2011) was probably
due to a mismatch between the high expectancy of the stimulus
appearance generated by the experimental procedure (decreasing
stimulus visibility in a sequence) and the missed stimulus
detection (i.e., ‘‘not seen’’ trials). This effect on the P2 component
was not observed in our ‘‘written words’’ experiment (Babiloni
et al., 2014), reasonably due to the negligible effect of learning,
stimulus expectancy, and cognitive load. Indeed, the duration
of the cue stimuli in our experiment was determined subject-
by-subject with a preliminary control test (no EEG recording),
designed to minimize the effects of learning. Afterward, the
physical stimulus features remained fixed during the whole EEG
experimental session. Finally, results of a control experiment
exhibited the lack of statistical differences among the mean
percentages of ‘‘seen’’ trials in three different periods of the EEG
experimental session, thus confirming the absence of a learning
or fatigue effect.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
This article discussed the results of three ERP experiments
of our group collectively testing the hypothesis that primary
visual consciousness (i.e., subjective self-report of the stimulus)
is related to an enhanced cortical neural synchronization as a
function of stimulus features. The experimental design compared
the ERP peak latency and sources between the ‘‘seen trials’’
and ‘‘not seen trials’’, respectively related and unrelated to the
primary visual consciousness. Three salient features of visual
stimuli were considered (visuospatial, emotional face expression,
and written words).
Results showed the typical ERP components following simple
visual stimuli in both ‘‘seen’’ and the ‘‘not seen’’ trials. In all
three experiments, there was no statistical difference (p > 0.05)
in the ERP peak latencies between the ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’
trials. This finding suggests a similar timing of the cortical neural
synchronization in the ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials, regardless
the primary visual consciousness.
In contrast, the ERP source analysis showed differences
between the ‘‘seen’’ and ‘‘not seen’’ trials. For the visuospatial
stimuli, the primary consciousness was related to higher activity
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in dorsal occipital and parietal sources at about 400 ms post-
stimulus. For the emotional face expressions, there was greater
activity in parietal and frontal sources at about 180 ms post-
stimulus. For the written letters, there was higher activity in
left occipital, parietal, and temporal sources at about 230 ms
post-stimulus. These hint that primary visual consciousness is
associated with an enhanced cortical neural synchronization
having entirely different spatiotemporal characteristics as a
function of the features of the visual stimuli and possibly, the
corresponding qualia (i.e., visuospatial, face expression, and
words). In this framework, the dorsal visual stream may be
synchronized in association with the primary consciousness of
visuospatial and emotional face contents, while both the dorsal
and ventral visual streams may be synchronized in association
with the primary consciousness of linguistic contents (Milner
and Goodale, 2006).
The results of the three experiments suggest the inclusion
of the neurophysiological mechanism of the cortical neural
synchronization in the theories of consciousness proposed
by the ‘‘localizationists’’ quoted in the Introduction of this
article. The magnitude of the cortical neural synchronization
within a specialized network may lead to the vividness of
the primary consciousness of a given stimulus feature and
relative ‘‘quale’’. In this line of reasoning, the ensemble of the
cortical neural networks underpinning the single visual features
would constitute a sort of multi-dimensional palette of colors,
shapes, regions of the visual field, movements, emotional face
expressions, and words. The synchronization of one or more
of these cortical neural networks, each with its peculiar timing,
would produce the primary consciousness of one or more of the
visual features of the scene.
Nevertheless, some limitations and methodological remarks of
our studies should be considered. Firstly, primary consciousness
should be not considered as an instantaneous mental experience
to be related with one peak of a local neural concomitant. Rather,
it should be considered as a progressive build-up phenomenon,
since it reasonably emerges from relatively long integrative
neural processes (i.e., hundreds of milliseconds), which might
be related to fluctuating information flux and temporal
synchronization among different brain regions (Tononi, 2001,
2004; Wyart et al., 2012).
Secondly, although different procedures to control for the
effects of learning and attention were adopted in the present
experiments, it is possible that some strange variables could affect
the reliability of our data. In order to overcome this problem a
better procedure might be the use of more fine-grained scales
to rate the visibility of the stimuli, including different levels of
confidence about the visibility reports, such as the four point PAS
(see Melloni et al., 2011).
Thirdly, EEG source analyses in our experiments were
carried out with LORETA/eLORETA whose spatial resolution
is much lower (centimeters) than that of positron emission
tomography (PET) and fMRI (millimeters). Of note, a
better solution for source localization can be achieved by
eLORETA and sLORETA than original LORETA (Pascual-
Marqui et al., 2002; Pascual-Marqui, 2007). Indeed, both
sLORETA and eLORETA showed low spatial resolution
but zero localization error in the presence of measurement
and biological noise in simulation studies (Pascual-Marqui
et al., 2002; Pascual-Marqui, 2007). Furthermore, it was
reported a better source location by eLORETA than sLORETA
(Canuet et al., 2011).
Finally, although our analyses were limited to just one neural
concomitant of the consciousness phenomenon (ERP sources),
other interesting developments of our general view have been
carried out, such as the influence of top-down processes on
the primary visual consciousness in the visuospatial experiment
(see above) or regard the causal role of the cortical neural
synchronization. In this vein, an experiment of our group showed
that an inhibitory low-frequency (1 Hz) repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over right or left posterior parietal
areas significantly reduced the percentage of visual stimuli
consciously perceived, thus confirming the causal contribution
of those areas in the primary visuospatial consciousness
(Babiloni et al., 2007). A new story of the consciousness has
just started.
FUNDING
The present article developed a general neurophysiological
interpretation of the results of three original studies (cited in
the main body text) financially supported by the Department
of Physiology and Pharmacology of the University of Rome
‘‘La Sapienza’’ and the Association Fatebenefratelli for Research
(AFaR). We thank all Authors of those original studies, with
a special mention to Dr. Fabrizio Vecchio and Prof. Paolo M.
Rossini for their precious contribution.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
All the authors developed the literature review. CB, AS, and AB
gave their contributions to the conception and design of the
review. CB and AB contributed to the writing of the first draft
of the manuscript. CB, AS, SC, JCM-C and CDP contributed
in drafting the work and revising it critically for important
intellectual content. SC, CDP and AB built the figures and the
reference list. All the authors collaborated in the revision of the
final manuscript.
REFERENCES
Babiloni, C., Del Percio, C., Soricelli, A., Cordone, S., Millán-Calenti, J. C.,
Marzano, N., et al. (under major revision in 2016). Cortical responses to
primary visual consciousness of words: a high resolution EEG study. Clin.
Neurophysiol.
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Buffo, P., Buttiglione, M., Cibelli, G., and Rossini, P. M.
(2010). Cortical responses to consciousness of schematic emotional facial
expressions: a high-resolution EEG study. Hum. Brain Mapp. 31, 1556–1569.
doi: 10.1002/hbm.20958
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Buffo, P., Iacoboni, M., Pistoia, F., Sacco, S., et al. (2014).
Mechanisms of cortical neural synchronization related to healthy and impaired
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 12 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 310
Babiloni et al. Neural Synchronization in Primary Consciousness
consciousness: evidence by quantitative electroencephalographic studies. Curr.
Pharm. Des. 20, 4225–4238. doi: 10.2174/13816128113196660647
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Miriello, M., Romani, G. L., and Rossini, P. M.
(2006). Visuo-spatial consciousness and parieto-occipital areas: a high-
resolution EEG study. Cereb. Cortex. 16, 37–46. doi: 10.1093/cercor/
bhi082
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Mirabella, G., Buttiglione, M., Sebastiano, F., Picardi, A.,
et al. (2009a). Hippocampal, amygdala and neocortical synchronization
of theta rhythms is related to an immediate recall during rey auditory
verbal learning test. Hum. Brain Mapp. 30, 2077–2089. doi: 10.1002/hbm.
20648
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Iacoboni, M., Buffo, P., Eusebi, F., and Rossini, P. M.
(2009b). Cortical sources of visual evoked potentials during consciousness of
executive processes. Hum. Brain Mapp. 30, 998–1013. doi: 10.1002/hbm.20567
Babiloni, C., Vecchio, F., Rossi, S., De Capua, A., Bartalini, S., Ulivelli, M.,
et al. (2007). Human ventral parietal cortex plays a functional role on
visuospatial attention and primary consciousness. A repetitive transcranial
magnetic stimulation study. Cereb. Cortex 17, 1486–1492. doi: 10.1093/cercor/
bhl060
Balconi, M., and Lucchiari, C. (2005). In the face of emotions: event-related
potentials in supraliminal and subliminal face expression recognition. Genet.
Soc. Gen. Psychol. Monogr. 131, 41–69. doi: 10.3200/mono.131.1.41-69
Batty, M., and Taylor, M. J. (2003). Early processing of the six basic facial
emotional expressions. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 17, 613–620. doi: 10.
1016/s0926-6410(03)00174-5
Baylis, G. C., Rafal, R. D., and Driver, J. (1993). Visual extinction and
stimulus repetition. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 5, 453–466. doi: 10.1162/jocn.1993.
5.4.453
Bentin, S., Sagiv, N., Mecklinger, A., Friederici, A., and von Cramon, Y. D. (2002).
Priming visual face-processing mechanisms: electrophysiological evidence.
Psychol. Sci. 13, 190–193. doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00435
Bressler, S. L. (2002). ‘‘Event-related potentials,’’ in The Handbook of Brain
Theory and Neural Networks, ed. M. A. Arbib (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
412–415.
Brett, M., Johnsrude, I. S., and Owen, A. M. (2002). The problem of functional
localization in the human brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 3, 243–249. doi: 10.
1038/nrn756
Buxhoeveden, D. P., and Casanova, M. F. (2002). The minicolumn hypothesis in
neuroscience. Brain 125, 935–951. doi: 10.1093/brain/awf110
Canuet, L., Ishii, R., Pascual-Marqui, R. D., Iwase, M., Kurimoto, R., Aoki, Y.,
et al. (2011). Resting-state EEG source localization and functional connectivity
in schizophrenia-like psychosis of epilepsy. PLoS One 6:e27863. doi: 10.
1371/journal.pone.0027863
Chica, A. B., Lasaponara, S., Lupiáñez, J., Doricchi, F., and Bartolomeo, P.
(2010). Exogenous attention can capture perceptual consciousness: ERP and
behavioural evidence. Neuroimage 51, 1205–1212. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.
2010.03.002
Crick, F., and Koch, C. (2003). A framework for consciousness. Nat. Neurosci. 6,
119–126. doi: 10.1038/nn0203-119
Dehaene, S., and Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of
consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition 79, 1–37.
doi: 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00123-2
Dehaene, S., Sergent, C., and Changeux, J. P. (2003). A neuronal network model
linking subjective reports and objective physiological data during conscious
perception. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 100, 8520–8525. doi: 10.1073/pnas.
1332574100
Del Cul, A., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2007). Brain dynamics underlying the
nonlinear threshold for access to consciousness. PLoS Biol. 5:e260. doi: 10.
1371/journal.pbio.0050260
Driver, J. (1996). ‘‘What can visual neglect and extinction reveal about the
extent of ‘‘preattentive’’ processing?’’ in Convergent Operations in the Study of
Visual Selective Attention, eds A. F. Kramer, M. G. H. Cole, and G. D. Logan
(Washington, DC: APA Press), 193–224.
Driver, J., Davis, G., Russell, C., Turatto, M., and Freeman, E. (2001).
Segmentation, attention and phenomenal visual objects. Cognition 80, 61–95.
doi: 10.1016/s0010-0277(00)00151-7
Driver, J., and Mattingley, J. B. (1998). Parietal neglect and visual awareness. Nat.
Neurosci. 1, 17–22. doi: 10.1038/217
Driver, J., Mattingley, J. B., Rorden, C., and Davis, G. (1997). ‘‘Extinction as a
paradigm measure of attentional bias and restricted capacity following brain
injury,’’ in Parietal Lobe Contributions to Orientation in 3D Space, eds H. O.
Karnath and P. Thier (Berlin: Springer), 401–429.
Driver, J., and Vuilleumier, P. (2001). Perceptual awareness and its loss in
unilateral neglect and extinction. Cognition 79, 39–88. doi: 10.1016/s0010-
0277(00)00124-4
Edelman, G. M. (2003). Naturalizing consciousness: a theoretical framework. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 100, 5520–5524. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0931349100
Edelman, G. M., and Tononi, G. (2000). A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter
Becomes Imagination. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Engel, A. K., Fries, P., König, P., Brecht, M., and Singer, W. (1999). Temporal
binding, binocular rivalry and consciousness. Conscious. Cogn. 8, 128–151.
doi: 10.1006/ccog.1999.0389
Engel, A. K., and Singer, W. (2001). Temporal binding and the neural correlates
of sensory awareness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 55, 16–25. doi: 10.1016/s1364-
6613(00)01568-0
Fernandez-Duque, D., Grossi, G., Thornton, I. M., and Neville, H. J.
(2003). Representation of change: Electrophysiological markers of attention,
awareness and implicit processing. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 15, 491–507. doi: 10.
1162/089892903321662895
Fuchs, M., Kastner, J., Wagner, M., Hawes, S., and Ebersole, J. S.
(2002). A standardized boundary element method volume conductor
model. Clin. Neurophysiol. 113, 702–712. doi: 10.1016/s1388-2457(02)
00030-5
Grech, R., Cassar, T., Muscat, J., Camilleri, K. P., Fabri, S. G., Zervakis, M.,
et al. (2008). Review on solving the inverse problem in EEG source analysis.
J. Neuroeng. Rehabil. 5:25. doi: 10.1186/1743-0003-5-25
Halgren, E., andMarinkovic, K. (1995). ‘‘Neurophysiological networks integrating
human emotions,’’ in The Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. M. Gazzaniga
(Cambridge: MIT Press), 1137–1152.
Heilman, K. M., Watson, R. T., and Valenstein, E. (1997). ‘‘Neglect: clinical and
anatomic aspects,’’ in Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychology, eds T. E.
Feinberg and M. J. Farah (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill), 309–317.
Horton, J. C., and Adams, D. L. (2005). The cortical column: a structure without a
function. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 360, 837–862. doi: 10.1098/rstb.
2005.1623
Hughes, S. W., Errington, A., Lorincz, M. L., Kékesi, K. A., Juhász, G., Orbán, G.,
et al. (2008). Novel modes of rhythmic burst firing at cognitively-relevant
frequencies in thalamocortical neurons. Brain Res. 15, 12–20. doi: 10.1016/j.
brainres.2008.06.029
Hughes, S. W., Lörincz, M. L., Blethyn, K., Kékesi, K. A., Juhász, G., Turmaine, M.,
et al. (2011). Thalamic gap junctions control local neuronal synchrony and
influence macroscopic oscillation amplitude during EEG alpha rhythms. Front.
Psychol. 22:193. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00193
Hughes, S. W., Lörincz, M., Cope, D. W., Blethyn, K. L., Kékesi, K. A., Parri, H. R.,
et al. (2004). Synchronized oscillations at alpha and theta frequencies in
the lateral geniculate nucleus. Neuron 42, 253–268. doi: 10.1016/s0896-
6273(04)00191-6
Jurcak, V., Tsuzuki, D., and Dan, I. (2007). 10/20, 10/10 and 10/5 systems revisited:
their validity as relative head-surface-based positioning systems. Neuroimage
34, 1600–1611. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.09.024
Kiefer, M., and Spitzer, M. (2000). Time course of conscious and unconscious
semantic brain activation. Neuroreport 11, 2401–2407. doi: 10.1097/00001756-
200008030-00013
Koivisto, M., Lähteenmäki, M., Sørensen, T. A., Vangkilde, S., Overgaard, M.,
and Revonsuo, A. (2008). The earliest electrophysiological correlate of
visual awareness? Brain Cogn. 66, 91–103. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2007.
05.010
Koivisto, M., and Revonsuo, A. (2008). The role of selective attention in visual
awareness of stimulus features: electrophysiological studies. Cogn. Affect.
Behav. Neurosci. 8, 195–210. doi: 10.3758/cabn.8.2.195
Koivisto, M., Revonsuo, A., and Salminen, N. (2005). Independence of visual
awareness from attention at early processing stages. Neuroreport. 16, 817–821.
doi: 10.1097/00001756-200505310-00008
Kouider, S. (2009). ‘‘Neurobiological theories of consciousness,’’ in Encyclopedia
of Consciousness, ed. W. Banks (Amsterdam: Academic Press, Elsevier),
87–100.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 13 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 310
Babiloni et al. Neural Synchronization in Primary Consciousness
Krombholz, A., Schaefer, F., and Boucsein, W. (2007). Modification of N170 by
different emotional expression of schematic faces. Biol. Psychol. 76, 156–162.
doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2007.07.004
Lamme, V. A. F. (2010). How neuroscience will change our view on consciousness.
Cogn. Neurosci. 1, 204–240. doi: 10.1080/17588921003731586
Lamy, D., Salti, M., and Bar-Haim, Y. (2009). Neural correlates of subjective
awareness and unconscious processing: An ERP study. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21,
1435–1446. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.21064
Lavie, N. (2006). The role of perceptual load in visual awareness. Brain Res. 1080,
91–100. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2005.10.023
Lisman, J. (2005). The theta/gamma discrete phase code occurring during the
hippocampal phase precession may be a more general brain coding scheme.
Hippocampus 15, 913–922. doi: 10.1002/hipo.20121
Liu, Y., Paradis, A. L., Yahia-Cherif, L., and Tallon-Baudry, C. (2012). Activity
in the lateral occipital cortex between 200 and 300 ms distinguishes between
physically identical seen and unseen stimuli. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:211.
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.00211
Lopes da Silva, F. (1991). Neural mechanisms underlying brain waves: From neural
membranes to networks. Electroenceph. Clin. Neurophysiol. 79, 81–93. doi: 10.
1016/0013-4694(91)90044-5
Lörincz, M. L., Crunelli, V., and Hughes, S. W. (2008). Cellular dynamics of
cholinergically induced alpha (8–13 Hz) rhythms in sensory thalamic nuclei
in vitro. J. Neurosci. 28, 660–671. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4468-07.2008
Lörincz, M. L., Kékesi, K. A., Juhász, G., Crunelli, V., and Hughes, S. W. (2009).
Temporal framing of thalamic relay-mode firing by phasic inhibition during
the alpha rhythm. Neuron 63, 683–696. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2009.08.012
Luck, S. J. (2005). An Introduction to the Event-Related Potential Technique.
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Luck, S. J., and Hillyard, S. A. (1994). Electrophysiological correlates of feature
analysis during visual search. Psychophysiology 31, 291–308. doi: 10.1111/j.
1469-8986.1994.tb02218.x
Marzi, C. A., Girelli, M., Miniussi, C., Smania, N., and Maravita, A.
(2000). Electrophysiological correlates of conscious vision: evidence from
unilateral extinction. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 12, 869–877. doi: 10.1162/089892900
562471
Marzi, C. A., Smania, N., Martini, M. C., Gambina, G., Tomelleri, G.,
Palamara, A., et al. (1996). Implicit redundant-targets effect in visual extinction.
Neuropsychologia 34, 9–22. doi: 10.1016/0028-3932(95)00059-3
Mathewson, K., Gratton, G., Fabiani, M., Beck, D. M., and Ro, T. (2009). To see
or not to see: Prestimulus a phase predicts visual awareness. J. Neurosci. 29,
2725–2732. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3963-08.2009
Mattingley, J. B., Driver, J., Beschin, N., and Robertson, I. H. (1997). Attentional
competition between modalities: extinction between touch and vision after
right hemisphere damage. Neuropsychologia 35, 867–880. doi: 10.1016/s0028-
3932(97)00008-0
Mazziotta, J., Toga, A., Evans, A., Fox, P., Lancaster, J., Zilles, K., et al. (2001).
A probabilistic atlas and reference system for the human brain: International
Consortium for Brain Mapping (ICBM). Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci.
356, 1293–1322. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2001.0915
Melloni, L., Schwiedrzik, C. M., Müller, N., Rodriguez, E., and Singer, W.
(2011). Expectations change the signatures and timing of electrophysiological
correlates of perceptual awareness. J. Neurosci. 31, 1386–1396. doi: 10.
1523/JNEUROSCI.4570-10.2011
Michel, C. M., Murray, M. M., Lantz, G., Gonzalez, S., Spinelli, L., and Grave
de Peralta, R. (2004). EEG source imaging. Clin. Neurophysiol. 15, 2195–2222.
doi: 10.1016/j.clinph.2004.06.001
Milner, A. D., and Goodale, M. A. (2006). The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford,
New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Murray, M. M., Brunet, D., and Michel, C. M. (2008). Topographic ERP analyses:
a step-by-step tutorial review. Brain. Topogr. 20, 249–264. doi: 10.1007/s10548-
008-0054-5
Nunez, P. L. (2000). Toward a quantitative description of large-scale neocortical
dynamic function and EEG. Behav. Brain Sci. 23, 371–398; discussion 399–437.
doi: 10.1017/s0140525x00003253
Nunez, P. L., and Srinivasan, R. (2006). A theoretical basis for standing and
travelling brain waves measured with human EEG with implications for an
integrated consciousness. Clin. Neurophysiol. 117, 2424–2435. doi: 10.1016/j.
clinph.2006.06.754
Nuwer, M. R. (1988). Quantitative EEG. I: techniques and problems of frequency
analysis and topographic mapping. J. Clin. Neurophysiol. 5, 1–43. doi: 10.
1097/00004691-198801000-00001
Pascual-Marqui, R. D. (2007). Discrete, 3D distributed, linear imaging methods of
electric neuronal activity. Part 1: exact, zero error localization. Available online
at: http://arxiv.org/pdf/0710.3341. Accessed November 19, 2015.
Pascual-Marqui, R. D., Esslen, M., Kochi, K., and Lehmann, D. (2002). Functional
imaging with low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (LORETA): a
review.Methods Find. Exp. Clin. Pharmacol. 24, 91–95.
Pascual-Marqui, R. D., Lehmann, D., Koenig, T., Kochi, K., Merlo, M. C.,
Hell, D., et al. (1999). Low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography
(LORETA) functional imaging in acute, neuroleptic-naive, first-episode,
productive schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res. 90, 169–179. doi: 10.1016/s0925-
4927(99)00013-x
Pascual-Marqui, R. D., and Michel, C. M. (1994). LORETA (low resolution brain
electromagnetic tomography): new authentic 3D functional images of the brain.
ISBET Newsl. ISNN 5, 4–8.
Pfurtscheller, G., and Lopes da Silva, F. H. (1999). Event-related EEG/MEG
synchronization and desynchronization: basic principles. Clin. Neurophysiol.
110, 1842–1857. doi: 10.1016/s1388-2457(99)00141-8
Pinker, S. (1997). How the Mind Works. London, UK: Penguin.
Pins, D., and Ffytche, D. (2003). The neural correlates of conscious vision. Cereb.
Cortex 13, 461–474. doi: 10.1093/cercor/13.5.461
Railo, H., Koivisto, M., and Revonsuo, A. (2011). Tracking the processes behind
conscious perception: a review of event-related potential correlates of visual
consciousness. Conscious. Cogn. 20, 972–983. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.
03.019
Rees, G., Wojciulik, E., Clarke, K., Husain, M., Frith, C., and Driver, J. (2000).
Unconscious activation of visual cortex in the damaged right hemisphere of a
parietal patient with extinction. Brain 123, 1624–1633. doi: 10.1093/brain/123.
8.1624
Robertson, L., Treisman, A., Friedman-Hill, S., and Grabowecky, M. (1997). The
interaction of spatial and object pathways: evidence from Balint’s syndrome.
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 9, 295–317. doi: 10.1162/jocn.1997.9.3.295
Rossetti, A. O., and Kaplan, P. W. (2010). Seizure semiology: an overview
of the ‘inverse problem’. Eur. Neurol. 63, 3–10. doi: 10.1159/0002
58634
Rossini, P. M., Rossi, S., Babiloni, C., and Polich, J. (2007). Clinical
neurophysiology of aging brain: from normal aging to neurodegeneration.
Prog. Neurobiol. 83, 375–400. doi: 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2007.07.010
Sandberg, K., Bahrami, B., Kanai, R., Barnes, G. R., Overgaard, M., and Rees, G.
(2013). Early visual responses predict conscious face perception within and
between subjects during binocular rivalry. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 25, 969–985.
doi: 10.1162/jocn_a_00353
Schweinberger, S. R., and Burton, A. M. (2003). Covert recognition and the
neural system for face processing.Cortex 39, 9–30. doi: 10.1016/s0010-9452(08)
70071-6
Sergent, C., Baillet, S., and Dehaene, S. (2005). Timing of the brain events
underlying access to consciousness during the attentional blink. Nat. Neurosci.
8, 1391–1400. doi: 10.1038/nn1549
Sokolov, E. N., and Boucsein, W. (2000). A psychophysiological model
of emotional space. Integr. Physiol. Behav. Sci. 35, 81–119. doi: 10.
1007/bf02688770
Steriade, M. (2006). Grouping of brain rhythms in corticothalamic systems.
Neuroscience 137, 1087–1106. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroscience.2005.10.029
Tononi, G. (2001). Informationmeasures for conscious experience.Arch. Ital. Biol.
139, 367–371.
Tononi, G. (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC
Neurosci. 5:42. doi: 10.1186/1471-2202-5-42
Tononi, G., and Koch, C. (2008). The neural correlates of consciousness: an
update. Ann. N Y Acad. Sci. 1124, 239–261. doi: 10.1196/annals.1440.004
Vogel, E. K., Luck, S. J., and Shapiro, K. L. (1998). Electrophysiological evidence
for a postperceptual locus of suppression during the attentional blink. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 24, 1656–1674. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.24.
6.1656
Vuilleumier, P., Armony, J. L., Clarke, K., Husain, M., Driver, J., and
Dolan, R. J. (2002). Neural response to emotional faces with and without
awareness: event-related fMRI in a parietal patient with visual extinction and
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 14 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 310
Babiloni et al. Neural Synchronization in Primary Consciousness
spatial neglect. Neuropsychologia 40, 2156–2166. doi: 10.1016/S0028-3932(02)
00045-3
Vuilleumier, P. O., and Rafal, R. D. (2000). A systematic study of visual extinction.
Between- and within-field deficits of attention in hemispatial neglect. Brain
123, 1263–1279. doi: 10.1093/brain/123.6.1263
Vuilleumier, P., Sagiv, N., Hazeltine, E., Poldrack, R. A., Swick, D., Rafal, R. D.,
et al. (2001). Neural fate of seen and unseen faces in visuospatial neglect: a
combined event-related functionalMRI and event-related potential study. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U S A 98, 3495–3500. doi: 10.1073/pnas.051436898
Wyart, V., Dehaene, S., and Tallon-Baudry, C. (2012). Early dissociation between
neural signatures of endogenous spatial attention and perceptual awareness
during visual masking. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 6:16. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2012.
00016
Wyart, V., and Tallon-Baudry, C. (2008). Neural dissociation between visual
awareness and spatial attention. J. Neurosci. 28, 2667–2679. doi: 10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4748-07.2008
Zeki, S. (2003). The disunity of consciousness. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 214–218.
doi: 10.1016/s1364-6613(03)00081-0
Zeki, S., and Bartels, A. (1999). Toward a theory of visual consciousness.Conscious.
Cogn. 8, 225–259. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1999.0390
Zheng, C., Bieri, K. W., Hsiao, Y. T., and Colgin, L. L. (2016). Spatial sequence
coding differs during slow and fast gamma rhythms in the hippocampus.
Neuron 89, 398–408. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2015.12.005
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Babiloni, Marzano, Soricelli, Cordone, Millán-Calenti, Del
Percio and Buján. This is an open-access article distributed under the
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution and reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the
original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in
this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 15 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 310
